Is Logical Consequence A Relation Between Fregean Propositions?

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Abstract

There is no doubt that many ideas of Frege heavily influence present-day analytic philosophy, but his notion of logical consequence is not one of them. Frege (1906) holds logical consequence to be a relation between thoughts, not signs—a stance contrasting sharply with today's model-theoretic and inferentialist approaches to logical consequence. Was Frege right? To compare Fregean logical consequence to our modern notion, I extend Blanchette's (2012) notion of a reading to capture the context of indexicals and further analysability of thoughts. I then assess the advantages and disadvantages of Frege's account and potential lessons for contemporary logic. In particular, the paper argues that the Fregean view of logical consequence can withstand recent objections by Gillian Russell (2008) and Elia Zardini (2022).

References

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